Jens
67b6b6285e
GeoIntel release gates / Compile, test, contracts and builds (push) Failing after 55s
GeoIntel release gates / Python and npm vulnerability policy (push) Failing after 41s
GeoIntel release gates / GIS image, SBOM and container scan (push) Failing after 1m52s
GeoIntel release gates / AI image, SBOM and container scan (push) Skipped
85 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
85 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# GeoIntel hardening — 2026-08-26
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This change set converts the 2026-08-26 repository audit into executable
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guardrails without widening any data-source or AI accuracy claim.
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## Implemented controls
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### Secure defaults
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- Guest access is opt-in instead of enabled by default.
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- Configured YOLO validation-scope enforcement is opt-out only in
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non-production research/development contexts.
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- Production YOLO uses CUDA. Configured inference remains bound to the existing
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immutable validation-scope service; absent or invalid scope evidence keeps
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YOLO unavailable without taking the GIS runtime offline.
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### Repository hygiene
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- New `.codex-input/` and `.codex-artifacts/` content is forbidden.
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- Transient SQLite WAL/SHM files are forbidden.
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- A tracked-file size budget prevents large local scratch artifacts from
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silently returning; governed accuracy evidence and presentation assets have
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explicit narrow allowlists.
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- All SQLite/WAL state, local calibration/error-review scratch, large contact
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sheets and DockDeck archives were removed from the current repository tree.
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- The remaining 32 DockDeck Stitch blobs could not be mass-deleted after the
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platform safety layer stopped further destructive operations. They are
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therefore frozen by exact path and exact Git blob SHA: they may be deleted,
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but any modification, replacement or new `.codex-input` file fails the
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release gate.
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Historical Git objects are intentionally not rewritten by this change. Purging
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old blobs requires a coordinated destructive history rewrite and force-update
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of every clone, so it is a separate operator decision.
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### Engineering quality
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- Repository architecture budgets turn the largest legacy modules into a
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ratchet: they may shrink but may not grow.
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- Critical Python static checks and frontend source-policy linting are release
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gates alongside the existing full tests, typecheck and build.
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- The source-policy gate forbids debugger statements, `@ts-ignore`, `eval()` and
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dynamic `Function` construction without adding an unlocked npm dependency.
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A migration to ESLint 10 remains a dependency upgrade rather than being mixed
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into this hardening pass. ESLint 9 reached upstream end-of-life in August 2026.
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### Supply chain
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- External Actions are pinned to full commit SHAs.
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- External Docker base/runtime images are digest-pinned.
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- CI verifies those policies so mutable references cannot silently return.
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- Both GIS and AI release images are built, SBOMed and scanned under the same
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vulnerability policy.
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- The Unraid Torch index default is aligned with the retained CUDA 12.8 runtime
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evidence instead of silently selecting a different CUDA wheel channel.
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### Deployment gating
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Tower autoredeploy is downstream of the successful `GeoIntel release gates`
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workflow on `main` and deploys the workflow's exact validated head SHA. A direct
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push can therefore no longer bypass release validation and immediately roll to
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production.
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## Explicit non-claims
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This hardening does **not**:
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- make the active building detector nationally validated;
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- replace the required geographically independent protected test and human
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review evidence;
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- convert guest mode into tenant isolation;
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- convert the PostgreSQL/in-process worker model into a distributed queue;
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- purge historical Git objects;
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- alter official source semantics or CRS contracts;
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- claim the 32 safety-frozen legacy Stitch blobs have already been removed.
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## External repository control
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Gitea branch protection for `main` is still required. The connected workspace
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can audit protection, create isolated branches, validate pull requests and merge
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them safely, but it does not expose a write operation for branch-protection
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rules. Until an administrator enables protection, the downstream validated
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deploy gate remains the compensating production control.
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