Two defects of the same kind: work that is supposed to be bounded is not.
The analysis worker selected queued jobs and then set them to running in a
second statement. A restarted process overlapping the previous one, or a second
replica, could both select the same row and both start tiled GPU inference on
it — duplicate analysis runs and double the GPU load. The AOI worker beside it
already claims with FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED; this uses a conditional update,
which is the same guarantee in one statement. run_once now reports jobs it
actually claimed rather than jobs it looked at.
urlopen follows redirects, so although every acquisition URL is built from
settings and cannot be steered by a request payload, a misconfigured or
compromised upstream could send the runtime to the loopback interface, to
another container on the compose network, or to a cloud metadata endpoint — and
the bytes would then be persisted under an official provenance. That is exactly
the substitution the product forbids. All eight fetch sites now open through a
guard that refuses private, loopback and link-local destinations (resolving the
host first, so a DNS name cannot hide one) and refuses a redirect that leaves
the configured origin or downgrades from HTTPS.
The guard is proven by calling the services' own fetch paths, not by grepping
for the call: every existing acquisition test injects an opener, which bypasses
it by design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The milestone and sprint documents below are retained as historical design and
implementation evidence. TODO.md is an implementation archive, not the
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