geointel/docs/HARDENING_2026-08-26.md

GeoIntel hardening — 2026-08-26

This change set converts the 2026-08-26 repository audit into executable guardrails without widening any data-source or AI accuracy claim.

Implemented controls

Secure defaults

• Guest access is opt-in instead of enabled by default.
• Configured YOLO validation-scope enforcement is opt-out only in non-production research/development contexts.
• Production YOLO uses CUDA. Configured inference remains bound to the existing immutable validation-scope service; absent or invalid scope evidence keeps YOLO unavailable without taking the GIS runtime offline.

Repository hygiene

• New .codex-input/ and .codex-artifacts/ content is forbidden.
• Transient SQLite WAL/SHM files are forbidden.
• A tracked-file size budget prevents large local scratch artifacts from silently returning; governed accuracy evidence and presentation assets have explicit narrow allowlists.
• All SQLite/WAL state, local calibration/error-review scratch, large contact sheets and DockDeck archives were removed from the current repository tree.
• The remaining 32 DockDeck Stitch blobs could not be mass-deleted after the platform safety layer stopped further destructive operations. They are therefore frozen by exact path and exact Git blob SHA: they may be deleted, but any modification, replacement or new .codex-input file fails the release gate.

Historical Git objects are intentionally not rewritten by this change. Purging old blobs requires a coordinated destructive history rewrite and force-update of every clone, so it is a separate operator decision.

Engineering quality

• Repository architecture budgets turn the largest legacy modules into a ratchet: they may shrink but may not grow.
• Critical Python static checks and frontend source-policy linting are release gates alongside the existing full tests, typecheck and build.
• The source-policy gate forbids debugger statements, @ts-ignore, eval() and dynamic Function construction without adding an unlocked npm dependency.

A migration to ESLint 10 remains a dependency upgrade rather than being mixed into this hardening pass. ESLint 9 reached upstream end-of-life in August 2026.

Supply chain

• External Actions are pinned to full commit SHAs.
• External Docker base/runtime images are digest-pinned.
• CI verifies those policies so mutable references cannot silently return.
• Both GIS and AI release images are built, SBOMed and scanned under the same vulnerability policy.
• The Unraid Torch index default is aligned with the retained CUDA 12.8 runtime evidence instead of silently selecting a different CUDA wheel channel.

Deployment gating

Tower autoredeploy is downstream of the successful GeoIntel release gates workflow on main and deploys the workflow's exact validated head SHA. A direct push can therefore no longer bypass release validation and immediately roll to production.

Explicit non-claims

This hardening does not:

• make the active building detector nationally validated;
• replace the required geographically independent protected test and human review evidence;
• convert guest mode into tenant isolation;
• convert the PostgreSQL/in-process worker model into a distributed queue;
• purge historical Git objects;
• alter official source semantics or CRS contracts;
• claim the 32 safety-frozen legacy Stitch blobs have already been removed.

External repository control

Gitea branch protection for main is still required. The connected workspace can audit protection, create isolated branches, validate pull requests and merge them safely, but it does not expose a write operation for branch-protection rules. Until an administrator enables protection, the downstream validated deploy gate remains the compensating production control.