docs: record complete current-tree scratch cleanup

docs/HARDENING_2026-08-26.md

@@ -7,27 +7,27 @@ guardrails without widening any data-source or AI accuracy claim.
 
 ### Secure defaults
 
-- Guest access is opt-in instead of enabled by default.
+- Guest access is opt-in instead of enabled by default across Settings, Compose,
+  the Unraid environment template, DockerMan runtime script and Unraid GUI
+  template.
 - Configured YOLO validation-scope enforcement is opt-out only in
   non-production research/development contexts.
 - Production YOLO uses CUDA. Configured inference remains bound to the existing
   immutable validation-scope service; absent or invalid scope evidence keeps
   YOLO unavailable without taking the GIS runtime offline.
+- The Unraid runtime now passes both the validation-scope manifest path and its
+  expected SHA-256 into the container.
 
 ### Repository hygiene
 
-- New `.codex-input/` and `.codex-artifacts/` content is forbidden.
+- `.codex-input/` and `.codex-artifacts/` are forbidden tracked paths.
 - Transient SQLite WAL/SHM files are forbidden.
 - A tracked-file size budget prevents large local scratch artifacts from
   silently returning; governed accuracy evidence and presentation assets have
   explicit narrow allowlists.
-- All SQLite/WAL state, local calibration/error-review scratch, large contact
-  sheets and DockDeck archives were removed from the current repository tree.
-- The remaining 32 DockDeck Stitch blobs could not be mass-deleted after the
-  platform safety layer stopped further destructive operations. They are
-  therefore frozen by exact path and exact Git blob SHA: they may be deleted,
-  but any modification, replacement or new `.codex-input` file fails the
-  release gate.
+- Cross-project DockDeck archives and Stitch imports, transient SQLite state,
+  generated contact sheets, calibration scratch and error-review scratch are
+  removed from the current repository tree.
 
 Historical Git objects are intentionally not rewritten by this change. Purging
 old blobs requires a coordinated destructive history rewrite and force-update
@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ of every clone, so it is a separate operator decision.
   gates alongside the existing full tests, typecheck and build.
 - The source-policy gate forbids debugger statements, `@ts-ignore`, `eval()` and
   dynamic `Function` construction without adding an unlocked npm dependency.
+- A managed `.gitea/workflows/chatgpt-validation.yml` exposes the allowlisted
+  `test`, `lint`, `typecheck`, `build`, `security` and `full` profiles expected
+  by ITWorx Gitea Workspace once this bootstrap change reaches the default
+  branch.
 
 A migration to ESLint 10 remains a dependency upgrade rather than being mixed
 into this hardening pass. ESLint 9 reached upstream end-of-life in August 2026.
@@ -49,9 +53,12 @@ into this hardening pass. ESLint 9 reached upstream end-of-life in August 2026.
 
 - External Actions are pinned to full commit SHAs.
 - External Docker base/runtime images are digest-pinned.
+- TruffleHog, Syft and Trivy execute through digest-pinned container images.
 - CI verifies those policies so mutable references cannot silently return.
 - Both GIS and AI release images are built, SBOMed and scanned under the same
   vulnerability policy.
+- Nested Gitea/act runners no longer rely on checkout host-path binds for
+  secret scanning, SBOM generation or container scanning.
 - The Unraid Torch index default is aligned with the retained CUDA 12.8 runtime
   evidence instead of silently selecting a different CUDA wheel channel.
 
@@ -72,13 +79,12 @@ This hardening does **not**:
 - convert guest mode into tenant isolation;
 - convert the PostgreSQL/in-process worker model into a distributed queue;
 - purge historical Git objects;
-- alter official source semantics or CRS contracts;
-- claim the 32 safety-frozen legacy Stitch blobs have already been removed.
+- alter official source semantics or CRS contracts.
 
 ## External repository control
 
 Gitea branch protection for `main` is still required. The connected workspace
 can audit protection, create isolated branches, validate pull requests and merge
-them safely, but it does not expose a write operation for branch-protection
-rules. Until an administrator enables protection, the downstream validated
-deploy gate remains the compensating production control.
+them safely, but its current capability catalog does not expose a write action
+for branch-protection rules. Until an administrator enables protection, the
+downstream validated deploy gate remains the compensating production control.