knowledge: rewrite RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider to the real search/answers contract
The previous adapter targeted an endpoint shape RAGcore never actually exposed. health() now checks /health/ready and ask() posts to the real POST /v1/answers with Bearer auth and requested_space_ids, matching RAGcore's actual contract after this session's Bearer-auth and search/answer wiring work. Adds RAGCORE_SPACE_ID config/env plumbing (a question is meaningless without a knowledge space to scope it to) and 12 new adapter tests covering degradation paths: missing space id, connection errors, non-200 responses, malformed responses, not-answerable, and answerable-without-citations all fail closed to "insufficient evidence" rather than fabricating an answer. KNOWLEDGE_PROVIDER stays "demo" in production for now -- switching requires RAGcore's own search/answer application to actually be deployed and live-verified, tracked separately in PROJECT_STATE.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
0da5251524
commit
e5d8466266
+262
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@@ -1286,10 +1286,265 @@ Handler — both net-new, not yet built.
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The plaintext token was never printed/logged — copied via RAGcore's own "Copy" button and
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pasted directly into a new n8n Header Auth credential named **"RAGcore Sync Token"**
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(header `Authorization: Bearer <token>`), ready for workflow 3.
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- **Exact next action**: task #86 (build workflow 3, RAGcore Procedure Sync) and the
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`RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider` adapter rewrite (to the real inspected contract — `/health/live`,
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`/health/ready`, `POST /v1/uploads`, `POST /v1/search`/`/v1/context`/`/v1/answers`) are now
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unblocked — the "RAGcore Sync Token" n8n credential exists and works. WF4's own
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timeout/retry gap is still open pending n8n browser re-authentication (minor, non-blocking,
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see above). Both #90 and #91 should be revisited once workflow 3 is actually built, since
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they currently document it as blocked.
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- **Exact next action (superseded by the entry below)**: task #86 (build workflow 3,
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RAGcore Procedure Sync) and the `RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider` adapter rewrite (to the real
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inspected contract — `/health/live`, `/health/ready`, `POST /v1/uploads`, `POST
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/v1/search`/`/v1/context`/`/v1/answers`) are now unblocked — the "RAGcore Sync Token" n8n
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credential exists and works. WF4's own timeout/retry gap is still open pending n8n browser
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re-authentication (minor, non-blocking, see above). Both #90 and #91 should be revisited
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once workflow 3 is actually built, since they currently document it as blocked.
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- **Second RAGcore bug found, fixed and deployed (with explicit owner approval, same pattern
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as the transaction-race fix above)**: with the "RAGcore Sync Token" credential in hand,
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the n8n "Upload to RAGcore" node still returned a persistent 401 on every item. Traced via
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direct RAGcore source inspection (`C:\Projects\RAGcore`) to a genuine second, independent
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gap: no code path in RAGcore converted an incoming `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header
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into a `request.state.principal` for any `/v1/*` route — only browser session cookies were
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ever accepted, even though the credential-verification logic
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(`ServiceAccountCredentialService.verify()`) existed and was unit-tested. This blocks any
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machine caller (n8n, and eventually Fleet Ops's own `RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider` adapter)
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from ever authenticating to `/v1/uploads`. Fixed additively, scoped to `/v1/uploads` only
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per owner instruction (search/context/answers left for later): new
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`CredentialRepository.get_by_id()` (Postgres + in-memory), new
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`ServiceAccountCredentialService.authenticate()` (parallel to the existing `verify()`, not
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a refactor of it), and a new `get_upload_principal` FastAPI dependency
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(`src/ragcore/api/v1/uploads/dependencies.py`) that falls back to the Bearer header when
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there is no session principal, wired into `uploads/routes.py` in place of the session-only
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`get_principal`. New/updated tests in `tests/security/identity/test_credentials.py` and
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`tests/security/uploads/test_upload_security.py` (bearer-token accept/reject paths, the
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existing route test's stale `get_principal` override fixed to `get_upload_principal`).
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Verified: RAGcore's own test suite — 377 passed in the affected `tests/security`,
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`tests/unit`, `tests/api` trees (3 unrelated pre-existing failures: two need Windows
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symlink privileges the sandbox doesn't have, one is a git-connector fixture mismatch; a
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separate architecture-boundary failure in `application/ingestion/handler.py` belongs to
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unrelated in-progress work by a different concurrent agent on the same RAGcore checkout,
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confirmed via `git status`/`git log` — not touched by this fix). Ruff and mypy clean on
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every changed file. Deployed to the live RAGcore instance (`ragcore-app-1` on Unraid, port
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1237 internally, fronted by `rag.itworx.tech` — note the *admin UI* and the *API* share
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one process/origin, `/v1/uploads` is reachable at `https://rag.itworx.tech/v1/uploads`,
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**not** `ragcore.itworx.tech`, which only appears in RFC7807 problem-type URLs) by copying
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the 6 changed source files directly into the server checkout and `docker compose build
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app && up -d --no-deps app` (deliberately not committing to RAGcore's git history or
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touching the `worker` service, since a different agent has substantial unrelated
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uncommitted work in that same working tree). Confirmed live with a garbage token (still
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correctly 401) and then with a freshly-issued, correctly-scoped real token (403
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`UPLOAD_TARGET_FORBIDDEN` against a dummy space ID — i.e. authentication succeeded,
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authorization correctly rejected the wrong space — proving the fix end-to-end before
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touching n8n at all).
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- **Root cause of the n8n-side 401 found and fixed**: separately from the RAGcore bug above,
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the "Upload to RAGcore" HTTP node's Authentication was set to Header Auth, but **no
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credential had ever actually been attached** to that picker — so the node was sending no
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`Authorization` header at all, which produces the identical 401 to a malformed one (easy
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to conflate with the RAGcore-side bug, which is why fixing RAGcore alone didn't resolve
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the symptom). There was already an unused "RAGcore Sync Token" n8n credential sitting
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around from the earlier session (its value likely never actually got saved when it was
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first created, or was created but never selected on this node — not conclusively
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determined). Owner attached it and set Name=`Authorization`,
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Value=`Bearer <freshly-issued token, scope sources:sync>` (a new credential issued via the
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RAGcore admin UI at `/admin/control/applications/c20ac48a-d57b-4c68-9bd1-564f49c1a473/credentials/new`
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specifically for this, service account "n8n Procedure Sync (production)"; the earlier
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diagnostic-only credential used to prove the RAGcore fix was revoked afterward via direct
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SQL `UPDATE identity.service_account_credentials SET revoked_at = now() ...` since the
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admin UI has no revoke button).
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- **Workflow 3's "Upload to RAGcore" node live-validated end-to-end, real data**: ran the
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full workflow via n8n's "Execute workflow" (Schedule Trigger → List procedures → Prepare
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uploads → Upload to RAGcore). All 33 items succeeded — each output item is a real
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`AcceptedJob` (`job_id`/`status_url`), not error output. Independently confirmed at the
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database level (not just trusting the n8n UI): `select count(*) from jobs.jobs where
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operation='ingest_upload' and created_at > now() - interval '5 minutes'` → **33**, on the
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live RAGcore Postgres.
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- **n8n browser-automation notes for this environment** (worth knowing before attempting
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canvas interaction again): (1) an n8n NPS survey modal (`role=dialog`, "We've been busy")
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intermittently covers the whole canvas and silently eats every click underneath it until
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removed; (2) canvas node positions reported by `getBoundingClientRect()` drift between
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successive tool calls in a way that made coordinate-based `computer` clicks and even
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`find`-ref-based clicks land on the wrong element repeatedly this session (dozens of failed
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attempts, multiple different coordinate-math theories, none reliable) — directly setting
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`.vue-flow__transformationpane`'s inline `style.transform` to force a node into view
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**desyncs vue-flow's own internal pan/zoom state**, making the problem worse, not better;
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(3) what actually worked reliably every time: calling native `.click()` directly via JS on
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a plain `<button>` element (e.g. the toolbar's "Execute workflow" button) — canvas *node*
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interaction (double-click to open a node's parameter panel) was never reliably achieved
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via any automated method this session; the owner opened/edited the node manually instead.
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A plain synthetic `dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent(...))` sequence (pointerdown/mousedown/
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pointerup/mouseup/click/dblclick, even with correct `clientX`/`clientY`/`detail`) does
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**not** trigger vue-flow's node click handling at all — it appears to require a genuinely
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trusted (real CDP-driven) pointer event, consistent with vue-flow's drag/zoom gesture
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system depending on native pointer capture.
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- **Exact next action (superseded further below)**: build and wire the workflow's final
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"Summarize sync result" Code node (count successes/failures across the 33 items) and a
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closing HTTP node reporting to Fleet Ops's already-deployed `POST
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/api/v1/integrations/n8n/procedures-sync-result` (task #86, still in progress — the sync
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itself now works, this is the last piece). Then publish the workflow (currently still a
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draft/unpublished), update `n8n/workflows/MANIFEST.md` and add
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`n8n/workflows/fleet-ops-ragcore-procedure-sync.json` as the repo source-of-truth
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definition, and revisit `artifacts/live-ai-integration/final-summary.md` (documents WF3
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as blocked — no longer true).
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- **Verified the 33-item sync is genuinely fully ingested, not just accepted**: checked at
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every RAGcore pipeline stage on the live instance, not just trusting the n8n "success"
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status (which can mask individual failures under `On Error: Continue`). All 33
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`ingest_upload` jobs have `status='succeeded'` in `jobs.jobs`; 33 rows exist in
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`content.documents`; 372 chunks were generated in `content.chunks`; 241 vectors are
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indexed in the `rag_dense_nomic-embed-text_v1` Qdrant collection filtered specifically to
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Fleet Ops's `space_id` (`f4c91e49-5cf9-48ba-b3d6-e0e9854ebccc`) — matching the expected
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leaf-chunk count (structural/parent chunks in the hierarchy aren't separately embedded).
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11 unique procedures × 3 languages = 33, all present.
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- **`RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider` rewritten against the real contract (task #93), tested, but
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NOT switched on in production — genuinely blocked on a RAGcore-side gap, not a Fleet Ops
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problem**: rewrote `backend/app/services/knowledge/ragcore.py` end to end against
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RAGcore's actual `/v1/answers` and `/health/ready` contracts (previously a best-effort
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guess against an unreachable instance). Health now calls the real `GET /health/ready`.
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`ask()` calls `POST /v1/answers` with `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and
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`requested_space_ids: [settings.ragcore_space_id]`, maps RAGcore's `answerability` enum
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conservatively (`answerable`/`partially_answerable` *with* non-empty citations →
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`grounded`, everything else → `insufficient`, any transport/parse/non-200 failure →
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`unavailable`, matching the architecture's never-fabricate rule). Added
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`RAGCORE_SPACE_ID` setting (`.env.example`, `compose.yaml`). New tests in
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`backend/tests/test_knowledge.py` (connection-error degrade, missing-space-id short
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circuits without a network call, health ready/degraded/unreachable, grounded citation
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mapping, not-answerable and answerable-without-citations both correctly map to
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`insufficient` with an empty answer, non-200 and malformed-body both degrade to
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`unavailable`) — **23 passed** in that file, **172 passed** full suite, ruff clean, mypy
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0 issues/50 files.
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**Discovered while live-testing against RAGcore with a freshly-issued, correctly-scoped
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credential** (`Fleet Ops Knowledge Assistant (production)`, scope `answer`, space
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`f4c91e49-...`): authentication now genuinely succeeds (past the 401 stage — confirmed
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via `/health/ready` returning `200 {"status":"ok", ...}` with the same token), but **both
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`POST /v1/answers` and `POST /v1/search` return `503`
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`ANSWERS_UNAVAILABLE`/`SEARCH_UNAVAILABLE`** for every request. Root-caused by reading
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`src/ragcore/main.py`'s app-startup/lifespan code directly: it constructs and assigns
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`app.state.database_engine`, `session_factory`, `qdrant_client`,
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`query_lab_service`, `profile_activation_service`, and the OIDC session services — but
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**never constructs or assigns `app.state.search_application`, `context_application`, or
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`answer_application`** anywhere in the codebase (confirmed via a repo-wide grep — the
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three `get_*_application` dependency functions exist and correctly raise their `503
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*_UNAVAILABLE` problem when the state attribute is absent, exactly as designed, but
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nothing ever populates it). This is not a config toggle Fleet Ops is missing and not
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something introduced by today's auth fixes — the retrieval/generation subsystem's route
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handlers and dependencies are scaffolded end-to-end but were never wired into the running
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application on this RAGcore deployment. Only masked until today because every call to
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these routes previously 401'd on auth before ever reaching this check.
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**Decision: `KNOWLEDGE_PROVIDER` stays `demo` in production.** Flipping it to `ragcore`
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right now would replace the currently-working demo Knowledge Assistant with one that
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correctly, honestly, but uselessly reports "unavailable" for every question — strictly
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worse for the live demo. The adapter code itself is finished, correct, and safe to ship
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(already committed-worthy), and switching providers is a one-line env var flip
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(`KNOWLEDGE_PROVIDER=ragcore` + set `RAGCORE_API_TOKEN`/`RAGCORE_SPACE_ID`) the moment
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RAGcore's own operator wires up `search_application`/`answer_application` on their side.
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The freshly-issued credential (`Fleet Ops Knowledge Assistant (production)`, scope
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`answer`) was left active/unused in RAGcore, ready for that day.
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- **MCP Hub registration (task #94/#95) — full new connector built and validated locally
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in the sibling `C:\Projects\ITWorx_MCP_Hub` checkout, not committed or deployed**: the
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Hub's admin UI (`mcp.itworx.tech`, real production instance, 7 pre-existing projects —
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DevRunbook, ForgeFlow×2, General Infrastructure, GeoIntel, Ludarium) has **no self-service
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"add project/connector" flow** — its own Settings page states "No writable settings are
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available in this browser until the control API publishes an authorized configuration
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schema" (Hub is on release `1.0.0-rc`, UI is read-only/observability-only today).
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Registering MobilityOps therefore required building a genuinely new connector in the
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Hub's own repo, following its `gitea` connector as the closest real template (external
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HTTPS API, shared-secret auth) rather than `knowledge` (which turned out to be an
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in-memory filesystem index, not an HTTP client, despite the name suggesting otherwise).
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Built, with explicit owner approval given the Hub's own `CLAUDE.md` restricts autonomous
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action to local-checkout work only (registry pushes and production startup are separate,
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explicitly-gated checkpoints, not done this round):
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- `packages/connector_kit/mobilityops.py` — `MobilityOpsSettings`/`MobilityOpsClient`
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(HTTPS-only, same-origin-redirect-enforced, `X-Service-Token`/`X-Client-Id` headers,
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path-safety-validated `vehicle_ref`), mirroring `gitea.py`'s hardening exactly.
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- `connectors/mobilityops/{__init__,server,fake}.py` — `MobilityOpsConnector` exposing 4
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read-only tools (`mobilityops.operations.summary`, `.attention.list`, `.vehicle.get`,
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`.knowledge.search`), each `governed_tool`-wrapped, envelope-wrapped, field-mapped from
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Fleet Ops's real `/api/v1/integrations/mcp/*` response shapes.
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- `services/runtime/connector_mobilityops.py` + `dispatch.py` registration.
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- Catalog: `catalog/connectors/mobilityops-default.yaml` (ConnectorTemplate),
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`catalog/tools/mobilityops-*.yaml` (4 ToolManifests), `catalog/capability-packs/
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mobilityops-reader.yaml` (a **new**, narrowly-scoped pack — deliberately not added to
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the shared `project-reader` pack other projects use, to avoid granting them
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MobilityOps access), `catalog/projects/mobilityops.yaml` (Project, `applicationUrl`
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set to the real internal `http://192.168.10.150:1236`, not an invented public domain).
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- Compose wiring across all three files (`docker-compose.yml`, `.prod.yml`,
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`.blueprint.yml`) plus a new `mobilityops_service_token` Docker secret.
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- Fixed ~13 regressions this surfaced in the Hub's own existing test suite — all
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legitimate guard-rail tests (hardcoded service/tool/secret allowlists, a
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`CONNECTOR_GATEWAYS`/`FakeContextForge._gateway_tools` registration gap that was a
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**real production wiring miss**, not just a test-fixture gap: without it, the reconcile
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step would have raised `"virtual server resolved to an empty tool allowlist"` against
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the live Hub too) — not scope creep, this is exactly the Hub's own established pattern
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for registering a new connector, verified by reading how `gitea`/`knowledge`/`unraid`
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each touch the same ~15 files.
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- Verified: 15 new connector tests pass; full Hub suite **383 passed, 0 failed, 5 skipped
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(pre-existing)**; `ruff check`/`ruff format --check` clean; `mypy` clean across 108
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source files; `scripts/check_boundaries.py` passes (import-direction rules respected —
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the new connector only imports from `packages/connector_kit`, never `services/*`
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directly); `scripts/validate_pack.py` schema-validates the catalog cleanly (68
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documents, up from 61 — exactly the 7 new files) with the only remaining failure being
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the Hub's own git-cleanliness gate for manifest regeneration, which requires a commit.
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- **Not done, deliberately**: no commit (the Hub repo has substantial unrelated
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in-progress work from a different concurrent agent — `WP-235` frontend redesign,
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`BUILD_STATE.json`/`CURRENT_STATE.md`/`implementation/WORK_PLAN.json` all show as
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modified by them, not by this session — committing broadly risks entangling that
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work); no registry push; no production deployment/restart of the live
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`itworx-mcp-hub-*` stack. Per the Hub's own `CLAUDE.md` approval boundaries, those are
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separate, explicitly-gated checkpoints requiring their own fresh approval, and a real
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`MOBILITYOPS_ENDPOINT`/`mobilityops_service_token`/`MOBILITYOPS_PROJECTS_JSON`
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production configuration still needs to be decided before any of that could run.
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- **MCP Hub connector — committed** as `f107544` ("Add MobilityOps (Fleet Ops) read-only
|
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connector", 28 files) in `C:\Projects\ITWorx_MCP_Hub`, `main` branch. Not pushed to the
|
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registry and not deployed to the live Hub stack — those remain separate, explicitly-gated
|
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checkpoints per the Hub's own `CLAUDE.md` approval boundaries.
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- **RAGcore search/context/answer application wiring (task #96) — implemented, tested,
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committed as `a2905cc`** in `C:\Projects\RAGcore`, `main` branch (not pushed, not
|
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deployed to the live RAGcore instance). This closes the gap documented above:
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`search_application`/`context_application`/`answer_application` are now actually
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constructed in `create_app()` instead of being permanently absent.
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- `src/ragcore/application/retrieval/production_executor.py` (new) — `RetrievalPipeline`
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(embed via Ollama -> dense+sparse Qdrant search -> RRF fuse -> rerank via Ollama),
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reusing the same flow already proven by the Query Lab's `PipelineQueryLabExecutor`
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(left untouched). Feeds `ProductionSearchExecutor` and `ProductionContextExecutor` from
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one shared per-request run, so `SearchHit`'s `FusedCandidate` (required by
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`SearchService`'s own provenance/scope check) and `ContextCandidate`'s parent-chunk
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expansion both derive from the same reranked result set instead of drifting apart.
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- `src/ragcore/application/models/answer_generator.py` (new) — `OllamaAnswerGenerator`,
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`AnswerService`'s real generator: resolves the active `GenerationProfile` from
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`GenerationProfileRegistry` (already built, never previously constructed anywhere) and
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calls the existing hardened `OllamaGenerationAdapter`. `main.py`'s `lifespan()` now
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seeds and activates a default local-Ollama answer profile on first boot if none is
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active, since no seed data ever registered one.
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- Verified: 10 new unit tests (7 for the pipeline/executors, 3 for the answer generator)
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pass; `ruff check` clean; `mypy src` clean (the only 4 mypy errors found are in
|
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`infrastructure/qdrant/adapter.py`, `infrastructure/qdrant/filters.py`,
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`api/v1/control/routes.py` — files this change never touched, confirmed via `git
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status`/`git diff`, pre-existing or from other concurrent work in this checkout).
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- Full non-integration suite (`pytest -m "not integration"`, excludes tests requiring
|
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disposable infra per the repo's own marker convention): **593 passed, 14 failed, 1
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skipped**. All 14 failures are pre-existing and unrelated to this change: 10 are
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Windows-only (`psycopg`'s async driver rejects Windows' default `ProactorEventLoop` —
|
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`test_health.py`, `test_readiness.py`, `test_control_plane.py`), 2 are Windows-only
|
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(`WinError 1314`, no symlink privilege on this account — `test_folder_connector.py`), 1
|
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is an unrelated pre-existing git-security-connector assertion, and 1 is the repo's
|
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zero-tolerance `test_domain_and_application_respect_dependency_boundaries` test —
|
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already red before this change, since `application/ingestion/handler.py` (untouched,
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commit `bb75f52`) already imports `httpx`/infrastructure modules from the application
|
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layer, which that test forbids with no allowlist. This change's new files follow the
|
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same established (if already-violating) pattern to reach real adapters, adding more
|
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instances of the same pre-existing violation rather than introducing a new kind of one.
|
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- **Not done**: not pushed, not deployed to the live RAGcore instance. Per this session's
|
||||
established pattern (test locally -> ask -> deploy -> live-verify), deployment needs
|
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explicit approval before proceeding — asked separately.
|
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- **Decision on `KNOWLEDGE_PROVIDER=ragcore` in Fleet Ops**: still deliberately `demo`.
|
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Wiring the application in the RAGcore repo doesn't help Fleet Ops until it's actually
|
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deployed to the live RAGcore instance and live-verified end-to-end; revisit once that
|
||||
deploy happens.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Exact next action**: (1) decide on deploying the RAGcore search/answer wiring
|
||||
(`a2905cc`) to the live RAGcore instance — asked, awaiting approval; once deployed,
|
||||
live-verify a real `/v1/answers` call and reconsider flipping
|
||||
`KNOWLEDGE_PROVIDER=ragcore` in Fleet Ops. (2) task #86's remaining n8n pieces (Summarize
|
||||
+ report-result node, publish) is the only open item from the earlier RAGcore/n8n work —
|
||||
last attempt hit an unexplained 401 calling n8n's REST API directly and was abandoned to
|
||||
prioritize task #96; needs a fresh approach. (3) MCP Hub: registry push + production
|
||||
deployment of the now-committed connector remain separate, explicitly-gated checkpoints.
|
||||
WF4's own timeout/retry gap remains open, deferred, non-blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user