M41: harden trust boundaries and delivery

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -1,19 +1,26 @@
-FROM python:3.12-slim
+FROM python:3.12-slim-bookworm@sha256:a116514e19457bcb7af7efe9c3dd0b9b71e85b317694e7882a1c52aa15a78134 AS runtime-base
 ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
 WORKDIR /app
-COPY backend/requirements.lock ./
-RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.lock
+COPY backend/requirements-prod.lock ./
+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements-prod.lock
 COPY backend/pyproject.toml ./
 COPY backend/app ./app
 COPY backend/alembic ./alembic
 COPY backend/alembic.ini ./
-COPY backend/tests ./tests
 COPY seed ./seed
 COPY knowledge ./knowledge
 COPY backend/entrypoint.sh ./entrypoint.sh
 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e . && chmod +x ./entrypoint.sh \
     && addgroup --system app && adduser --system --ingroup app --home /app app \
     && chown -R app:app /app
+
+FROM runtime-base AS test
+COPY backend/requirements.lock ./requirements.lock
+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.lock
+COPY backend/tests ./tests
+USER app
+
+FROM runtime-base AS runtime
 # Run migrations and the API as an unprivileged user; nothing here needs root.
 USER app
 EXPOSE 8000

backend/alembic/versions/4f2b9c8d7e61_unique_open_quality_condition.py

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"""enforce one open issue per detected condition
+
+Revision ID: 4f2b9c8d7e61
+Revises: 0a4c1d2e3f5b
+"""
+
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+revision = "4f2b9c8d7e61"
+down_revision = "0a4c1d2e3f5b"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.create_index(
+        "uq_data_quality_one_open_condition",
+        "data_quality_issues",
+        ["rule_type", "entity_type", "entity_id"],
+        unique=True,
+        postgresql_where=sa.text("status = 'open'"),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_index("uq_data_quality_one_open_condition", table_name="data_quality_issues")

backend/app/api/deps.py

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def require_operations_manager(
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class McpClientContext:
-    client_id: str
+    reported_client_id: str
     tenant: str
 
 
@@ -91,4 +91,4 @@ def require_mcp_service_token(
         )
     if x_tenant_id is not None and x_tenant_id != settings.ragcore_tenant:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Tenant mismatch")
-    return McpClientContext(client_id=x_client_id, tenant=settings.ragcore_tenant)
+    return McpClientContext(reported_client_id=x_client_id, tenant=settings.ragcore_tenant)

backend/app/api/routers/auth.py

@@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ _login_limiter = (
 
 def _client_key(request: Request) -> str:
     # The API sits behind the web container's reverse proxy in every documented
-    # deployment; honour the first hop of X-Forwarded-For when present.
+    # deployment. The proxy appends/overwrites the socket peer as the final hop, so an
+    # attacker-controlled leading value must never select a fresh limiter bucket.
     forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
     if forwarded:
-        return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
+        return forwarded.split(",")[-1].strip()
     return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
 
 
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ def _allowed_oidc_email(email: str) -> bool:
 def _resolve_oidc_user(db: Session, claims: dict[str, object]) -> User:
     subject = str(claims.get("sub") or "").strip()
     email = str(claims.get("email") or "").strip().lower()
-    if not subject or not email or claims.get("email_verified") is False:
+    if not subject or not email or claims.get("email_verified") is not True:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Verified OIDC email and subject are required")
     if not _allowed_oidc_email(email):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Email domain is not allowed")

backend/app/api/routers/knowledge.py

@@ -1,20 +1,32 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import hashlib
 import uuid
 from typing import Literal
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
 from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_db
+from app.core.config import get_settings
+from app.core.ratelimit import SlidingWindowLimiter
 from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
 from app.schemas import CurrentUser
 from app.services.audit import record_audit_event
 from app.services.knowledge import GroundedAnswer, KnowledgeHealth, get_knowledge_provider
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/knowledge", tags=["knowledge"])
+settings = get_settings()
+_question_limiter = (
+    SlidingWindowLimiter(
+        max_requests=settings.knowledge_max_requests,
+        window_seconds=settings.knowledge_rate_limit_window_seconds,
+    )
+    if settings.knowledge_max_requests > 0
+    else None
+)
 
 SupportedLanguage = Literal["nl-BE", "en-GB", "fr-BE"]
 
@@ -32,9 +44,29 @@ class KnowledgeFeedbackRequest(BaseModel):
 @router.post("/questions", response_model=GroundedAnswer)
 def ask_question(
     body: AskQuestionRequest,
+    request: Request,
     db: Session = Depends(get_db),
     user: CurrentUser = Depends(get_current_user),
 ) -> GroundedAnswer:
+    if _question_limiter is not None:
+        forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
+        client_ip = (
+            forwarded.split(",")[-1].strip()
+            if forwarded
+            else request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+        )
+        token = request.cookies.get(settings.session_cookie_name, "")
+        session_key = hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        retry_after = max(
+            _question_limiter.consume(f"ip:{client_ip}"),
+            _question_limiter.consume(f"session:{session_key}"),
+        )
+        if retry_after:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+                detail="Too many knowledge questions. Try again later.",
+                headers={"Retry-After": str(retry_after)},
+            )
     correlation_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
     provider = get_knowledge_provider()
     answer = provider.ask(body.question, correlation_id, body.language)

backend/app/api/routers/mcp_integrations.py

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ def get_correlation_id(
 def _audit_service_request(
     db: Session,
     *,
-    client_id: str,
+    reported_client_id: str,
     tool: str,
     status_label: str,
     correlation_id: str,
@@ -53,11 +53,19 @@ def _audit_service_request(
     record_audit_event(
         db,
         actor_type="service",
-        actor_label=client_id,
+        # The shared service token authenticates the Hub, not the caller identity that
+        # the Hub reports in a header. Keep attribution authoritative and retain the
+        # reported value only as explicitly non-authenticated diagnostic metadata.
+        actor_label="itworx-mcp-hub",
         action="mcp_tool_request",
         entity_type="mcp_tool",
         correlation_id=uuid.UUID(correlation_id),
-        metadata={"tool": tool, "status": status_label, **(metadata or {})},
+        metadata={
+            "tool": tool,
+            "status": status_label,
+            "reported_client_id": reported_client_id,
+            **(metadata or {}),
+        },
     )
     db.commit()
 
@@ -79,7 +87,7 @@ def operations_summary(
     _set_trace_headers(response, correlation_id, client.tenant)
     _audit_service_request(
         db,
-        client_id=client.client_id,
+        reported_client_id=client.reported_client_id,
         tool="fleet_ops_get_operations_summary",
         status_label="ok",
         correlation_id=correlation_id,
@@ -103,7 +111,7 @@ def attention_vehicles(
     _set_trace_headers(response, correlation_id, client.tenant)
     _audit_service_request(
         db,
-        client_id=client.client_id,
+        reported_client_id=client.reported_client_id,
         tool="fleet_ops_list_attention_vehicles",
         status_label="ok",
         correlation_id=correlation_id,
@@ -124,7 +132,7 @@ def vehicle_details(
     if vehicle is None:
         _audit_service_request(
             db,
-            client_id=client.client_id,
+            reported_client_id=client.reported_client_id,
             tool="fleet_ops_get_vehicle_details",
             status_label="not_found",
             correlation_id=correlation_id,
@@ -146,7 +154,7 @@ def vehicle_details(
 
     _audit_service_request(
         db,
-        client_id=client.client_id,
+        reported_client_id=client.reported_client_id,
         tool="fleet_ops_get_vehicle_details",
         status_label="ok",
         correlation_id=correlation_id,
@@ -182,7 +190,7 @@ def search_knowledge(
     response.headers["X-Sources-Returned"] = str(len(answer.sources))
     _audit_service_request(
         db,
-        client_id=client.client_id,
+        reported_client_id=client.reported_client_id,
         tool="fleet_ops_search_knowledge",
         status_label=answer.evidence_state,
         correlation_id=correlation_id,

backend/app/core/config.py

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     ragcore_api_token: str = ""
     ragcore_space_id: str = ""
     ragcore_http_timeout_seconds: float = 5.0
+    # Search fallback is only labelled grounded above this explicit retrieval threshold.
+    ragcore_min_search_score: float = 0.05
     n8n_webhook_url: str = "http://n8n:5678/webhook/mobilityops-return"
     n8n_webhook_trigger_token: str = "replace-me-n8n-webhook-trigger-token"
     n8n_callback_token: str = "replace-me-n8n-callback-token"
@@ -67,6 +69,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # Failed password logins per client IP before a temporary 429 (0 disables).
     login_max_failures: int = 10
     login_failure_window_seconds: int = 900
+    knowledge_max_requests: int = 30
+    knowledge_rate_limit_window_seconds: int = 60
     metrics_bearer_token: str = ""
     privacy_minimum_booking_retention_days: int = 30
     privacy_audit_retention_days: int = 2555
@@ -86,13 +90,11 @@ INSECURE_DEFAULT_SECRETS: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
 def insecure_default_secrets(settings: "Settings") -> list[str]:
     """Return the names of secret settings that still carry their placeholder value.
 
-    Only secrets that actually guard something in the given deployment are reported:
-    ``mcp_hub_service_token`` is irrelevant while MCP Hub registration is disabled.
+    MCP routes are always mounted, independently of the Hub reachability-status flag, so
+    their inbound token must always be non-placeholder in production.
     """
     insecure: list[str] = []
     for name, placeholder in INSECURE_DEFAULT_SECRETS:
-        if name == "mcp_hub_service_token" and not settings.mcp_hub_registration_enabled:
-            continue
         value = getattr(settings, name)
         if not value or value == placeholder or value.startswith("replace-me"):
             insecure.append(name)
@@ -112,4 +114,8 @@ def get_settings() -> Settings:
                 + ", ".join(insecure)
                 + ". Set real values in the environment (see .env.example)."
             )
+        if not settings.mobilityops_public_url.lower().startswith("https://"):
+            raise RuntimeError("Production MOBILITYOPS_PUBLIC_URL must use HTTPS.")
+        if not settings.session_cookie_secure:
+            raise RuntimeError("Production SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE must be true.")
     return settings

backend/app/core/ratelimit.py

@@ -47,3 +47,26 @@ class FailedAttemptLimiter:
     def reset(self, key: str) -> None:
         with self._lock:
             self._failures.pop(key, None)
+
+
+class SlidingWindowLimiter:
+    """Thread-safe request limiter where every accepted request consumes capacity."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *, max_requests: int, window_seconds: float) -> None:
+        self.max_requests = max_requests
+        self.window_seconds = window_seconds
+        self._requests: dict[str, deque[float]] = {}
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def consume(self, key: str) -> int:
+        """Record an accepted request, or return the seconds until capacity is available."""
+        now = time.monotonic()
+        with self._lock:
+            bucket = self._requests.setdefault(key, deque())
+            cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
+            while bucket and bucket[0] <= cutoff:
+                bucket.popleft()
+            if len(bucket) >= self.max_requests:
+                return max(1, int(bucket[0] + self.window_seconds - now + 0.999))
+            bucket.append(now)
+            return 0

backend/app/models/data_quality.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
-from sqlalchemy import CheckConstraint, DateTime, ForeignKey, Index, String
+from sqlalchemy import CheckConstraint, DateTime, ForeignKey, Index, String, text
 from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import JSONB, UUID
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column, relationship
 
@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ class DataQualityIssue(UUIDPrimaryKeyMixin, TimestampMixin, Base):
             name="ck_data_quality_status",
         ),
         Index("ix_data_quality_work_queue", "status", "due_at", "severity"),
+        Index(
+            "uq_data_quality_one_open_condition",
+            "rule_type",
+            "entity_type",
+            "entity_id",
+            unique=True,
+            postgresql_where=text("status = 'open'"),
+        ),
     )
 
     public_ref: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), unique=True, nullable=False)

backend/app/services/data_quality.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 from difflib import SequenceMatcher
 
-from sqlalchemy import select, update
+from sqlalchemy import func, select, update
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
 from app.core.errors import AppError
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ from app.services.vehicle_status import (
 REQUIRED_CUSTOMER_FIELDS = ("first_name", "last_name")
 REQUIRED_VEHICLE_FIELDS = ("registration_number", "make", "model", "location")
 DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD = 70
+DATA_QUALITY_SCAN_LOCK_ID = 6_138_493_717_091_029_491
 
 
 def issue_due_at(detected_at: datetime, severity: str) -> datetime:
@@ -356,6 +357,9 @@ def _scan_odometer_regressions(db: Session, scan: ScanResult) -> None:
 def run_scan(
     db: Session, *, actor_label: str | None = None, actor_type: str = "user"
 ) -> ScanResult:
+    # The check-then-insert work below spans several rules. Serialise whole scans at the
+    # database boundary so API and n8n triggers cannot both observe an empty condition.
+    db.scalar(select(func.pg_advisory_xact_lock(DATA_QUALITY_SCAN_LOCK_ID)))
     scan = ScanResult()
     _scan_duplicate_customers(db, scan)
     _scan_missing_required_fields(db, scan)
@@ -375,8 +379,13 @@ def run_scan(
     return scan
 
 
-def _load_open_issue(db: Session, public_ref: str) -> DataQualityIssue:
-    issue = db.scalar(select(DataQualityIssue).where(DataQualityIssue.public_ref == public_ref))
+def _load_open_issue(
+    db: Session, public_ref: str, *, lock: bool = True
+) -> DataQualityIssue:
+    statement = select(DataQualityIssue).where(DataQualityIssue.public_ref == public_ref)
+    if lock:
+        statement = statement.with_for_update()
+    issue = db.scalar(statement)
     if issue is None:
         raise AppError("ISSUE_NOT_FOUND", "Data quality issue not found.", status_code=404)
     if issue.status != "open":
@@ -707,8 +716,10 @@ def resolve_booking_overlap(
     return issue
 
 
-def _load_vehicle_status_conflict_issue(db: Session, public_ref: str) -> DataQualityIssue:
-    issue = _load_open_issue(db, public_ref)
+def _load_vehicle_status_conflict_issue(
+    db: Session, public_ref: str, *, lock: bool = True
+) -> DataQualityIssue:
+    issue = _load_open_issue(db, public_ref, lock=lock)
     if issue.rule_type != "vehicle_status_conflict":
         raise AppError(
             "NOT_A_STATUS_CONFLICT_ISSUE",
@@ -724,7 +735,7 @@ def preview_vehicle_status_recommendation(
     """Non-mutating: computes and returns the recommendation only. Never resolves the
     issue, never writes an audit event, never queues automation -- safe to call as often
     as the UI needs (e.g. every time the panel is opened) with zero side effects."""
-    issue = _load_vehicle_status_conflict_issue(db, public_ref)
+    issue = _load_vehicle_status_conflict_issue(db, public_ref, lock=False)
     vehicle = db.scalar(select(Vehicle).where(Vehicle.id == issue.entity_id))
     if vehicle is None:
         raise AppError(

backend/app/services/knowledge/ragcore.py

@@ -92,6 +92,17 @@ def _rank_sources_for_concepts(sources: list[SourceCard], concepts: set[str]) ->
     )
 
 
+def _retrieval_score(result: dict) -> float | None:
+    scores = result.get("scores")
+    if not isinstance(scores, dict):
+        return None
+    for name in ("rerank", "fused"):
+        value = scores.get(name)
+        if isinstance(value, int | float) and not isinstance(value, bool):
+            return float(value)
+    return None
+
+
 class RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider:
     """Adapter for the central RAGcore service, against its real `/v1/*` contract
     (see `docs/contracts/openapi.yaml` in the RAGcore checkout -- RAGcore is built and
@@ -338,6 +349,8 @@ class RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider:
 
         try:
             results = body.get("results", [])
+            if not isinstance(results, list):
+                raise TypeError("results must be a list")
             sources = [
                 SourceCard(
                     document_id=str(result["citation"]["document_id"]),
@@ -351,10 +364,21 @@ class RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider:
         except (TypeError, KeyError, ValueError):
             return unavailable
 
-        sources = _deduplicate_sources(sources)
+        all_sources = _deduplicate_sources(sources)
         concepts = _question_concepts(question)
-        sources = _rank_sources_for_concepts(sources, concepts)
-        if not sources:
+        qualified_sources = [
+            SourceCard(
+                document_id=str(result["citation"]["document_id"]),
+                title=result["citation"]["title"],
+                version=str(result["citation"]["document_version_id"]),
+                section=result["citation"].get("section") or "",
+                excerpt=result["citation"]["excerpt"],
+            )
+            for result in results
+            if (_retrieval_score(result) or 0.0) >= self._settings.ragcore_min_search_score
+        ]
+        sources = _rank_sources_for_concepts(_deduplicate_sources(qualified_sources), concepts)
+        if not all_sources:
             return GroundedAnswer(
                 answer="",
                 evidence_state="insufficient",
@@ -363,11 +387,19 @@ class RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider:
                 correlation_id=correlation_id,
             )
 
-        if not concepts:
+        damage_evidence = any(
+            term
+            in (
+                f"{source.document_id} {source.title} {source.section} {source.excerpt}"
+            ).casefold()
+            for source in sources
+            for term in _DOMAIN_CONCEPTS["damage"]
+        )
+        if not concepts or not sources or ("damage" in concepts and not damage_evidence):
             return GroundedAnswer(
                 answer="",
                 evidence_state="insufficient",
-                sources=sources,
+                sources=all_sources,
                 provider=self.name,
                 correlation_id=correlation_id,
             )

backend/requirements-prod.lock

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+#
+# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile with Python 3.12
+# by the following command:
+#
+#    pip-compile --constraint=requirements.lock --output-file=requirements-prod.lock pyproject.toml
+#
+alembic==1.18.5
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+annotated-doc==0.0.5
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   fastapi
+annotated-types==0.8.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   pydantic
+anyio==4.14.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   httpx
+    #   starlette
+    #   watchfiles
+authlib==1.7.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+certifi==2026.7.22
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   httpcore
+    #   httpx
+cffi==2.1.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   cryptography
+click==8.4.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn
+cryptography==50.0.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   authlib
+    #   joserfc
+fastapi==0.141.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+greenlet==3.5.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   sqlalchemy
+h11==0.16.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   httpcore
+    #   uvicorn
+httpcore==1.0.9
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   httpx
+httptools==0.8.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn
+httpx==0.28.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+idna==3.18
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   anyio
+    #   httpx
+itsdangerous==2.2.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+joserfc==1.7.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   authlib
+mako==1.3.12
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   alembic
+markupsafe==3.0.3
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mako
+prometheus-client==0.26.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+psycopg[binary]==3.3.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+psycopg-binary==3.3.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   psycopg
+pycparser==3.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   cffi
+pydantic==2.13.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   fastapi
+    #   pydantic-settings
+pydantic-core==2.46.4
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   pydantic
+pydantic-settings==2.14.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+python-dotenv==1.2.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   pydantic-settings
+    #   uvicorn
+pyyaml==6.0.3
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn
+sqlalchemy==2.0.51
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   alembic
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+starlette==1.3.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   fastapi
+typing-extensions==4.16.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   alembic
+    #   anyio
+    #   fastapi
+    #   psycopg
+    #   pydantic
+    #   pydantic-core
+    #   sqlalchemy
+    #   starlette
+    #   typing-inspection
+typing-inspection==0.4.2
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   fastapi
+    #   pydantic
+    #   pydantic-settings
+uvicorn[standard]==0.52.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   mobilityops-api (pyproject.toml)
+uvloop==0.22.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn
+watchfiles==1.2.0
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn
+websockets==17.0.1
+    # via
+    #   -c requirements.lock
+    #   uvicorn

backend/tests/test_auth.py

@@ -46,6 +46,29 @@ def test_oidc_callback_auto_provisions_and_logs_in(client, monkeypatch):
     assert session.json()["role"] == "rental_employee"
 
 
+def test_oidc_callback_rejects_missing_email_verification_claim(client, monkeypatch):
+    import app.api.routers.auth as auth_router
+
+    class FakeClient:
+        async def authorize_access_token(self, _request):
+            return {"userinfo": {"sub": "unverified-subject", "email": "new@example.test"}}
+
+    class FakeOAuth:
+        def create_client(self, _name):
+            return FakeClient()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router.settings, "oidc_enabled", True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router.settings, "oidc_issuer_url", "https://id.example.test")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router.settings, "oidc_client_id", "client")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router.settings, "oidc_client_secret", "secret")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router.settings, "oidc_allowed_email_domains", "example.test")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router, "oauth", FakeOAuth())
+
+    response = client.get("/api/v1/auth/oidc/callback", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    assert client.get("/api/v1/auth/session").status_code == 401
+
+
 def test_demo_login_grants_access(ops_client):
     response = ops_client.get("/api/v1/dashboard")
     assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -173,4 +196,8 @@ def test_demo_reset_preserves_integration_telemetry(ops_client, client):
 
     assert client.post("/api/v1/demo/login", json={"role": "operations_manager"}).status_code == 200
     events = client.get("/api/v1/audit", params={"action": "mcp_tool_request"}).json()
-    assert any(event["actor_label"].endswith(":reset-probe") for event in events)
+    assert any(
+        event["actor_label"] == "itworx-mcp-hub"
+        and event["metadata"].get("reported_client_id", "").endswith(":reset-probe")
+        for event in events
+    )

backend/tests/test_hardening.py

@@ -3,33 +3,37 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import uuid
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from threading import Barrier
 
 import pytest
-from sqlalchemy import delete, select
+from sqlalchemy import delete, func, select
 
 from app.core.config import Settings, get_settings, insecure_default_secrets
 from app.core.db import SessionLocal
+from app.core.errors import AppError
 from app.core.observability import UNMATCHED_ROUTE_LABEL
-from app.core.ratelimit import FailedAttemptLimiter
+from app.core.ratelimit import FailedAttemptLimiter, SlidingWindowLimiter
 from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
 from app.models.customer import Customer
 from app.models.data_quality import DataQualityIssue
-from app.services.data_quality import run_scan
+from app.schemas import CurrentUser
+from app.services.data_quality import defer_issue, run_scan
 from tests.test_return import _activate_booking, _return_body
 
 
-def test_insecure_defaults_are_detected_only_for_relevant_secrets():
+def test_insecure_defaults_include_mounted_mcp_boundary_even_when_status_check_is_disabled():
     defaults = Settings(_env_file=None)
     assert "app_secret" in insecure_default_secrets(defaults)
-    assert "mcp_hub_service_token" not in insecure_default_secrets(defaults)
+    assert "mcp_hub_service_token" in insecure_default_secrets(defaults)
     hardened = Settings(
         _env_file=None,
         app_secret="x" * 32,
         n8n_callback_token="c" * 32,
-        mcp_hub_registration_enabled=True,
+        mcp_hub_service_token="m" * 32,
     )
-    assert insecure_default_secrets(hardened) == ["mcp_hub_service_token"]
+    assert insecure_default_secrets(hardened) == []
 
 
 def test_production_refuses_to_start_with_placeholder_secrets(monkeypatch):
@@ -47,6 +51,37 @@ def test_production_refuses_to_start_with_placeholder_secrets(monkeypatch):
     assert get_settings().mobilityops_env == "test"
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("public_url", "secure_cookie", "message"),
+    [
+        ("http://fleetops.example.test", "true", "must use HTTPS"),
+        ("https://fleetops.example.test", "false", "must be true"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_production_refuses_cleartext_or_insecure_session_cookie(
+    monkeypatch, public_url, secure_cookie, message
+):
+    values = {
+        "MOBILITYOPS_ENV": "production",
+        "APP_SECRET": "a" * 32,
+        "N8N_CALLBACK_TOKEN": "c" * 32,
+        "MCP_HUB_SERVICE_TOKEN": "m" * 32,
+        "MOBILITYOPS_PUBLIC_URL": public_url,
+        "SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE": secure_cookie,
+    }
+    for name, value in values.items():
+        monkeypatch.setenv(name, value)
+    get_settings.cache_clear()
+    try:
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match=message):
+            get_settings()
+    finally:
+        get_settings.cache_clear()
+        monkeypatch.undo()
+        get_settings.cache_clear()
+    assert get_settings().mobilityops_env == "test"
+
+
 def test_failed_attempt_limiter_blocks_after_threshold_and_resets():
     limiter = FailedAttemptLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60)
     for _ in range(3):
@@ -58,6 +93,29 @@ def test_failed_attempt_limiter_blocks_after_threshold_and_resets():
     assert limiter.retry_after_seconds("1.2.3.4") == 0
 
 
+def test_sliding_window_limiter_counts_successes_and_isolates_keys():
+    limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_requests=2, window_seconds=60)
+    assert limiter.consume("session-a") == 0
+    assert limiter.consume("session-a") == 0
+    assert limiter.consume("session-a") > 0
+    assert limiter.consume("session-b") == 0
+
+
+def test_login_client_key_uses_proxy_appended_peer_not_spoofed_leading_value():
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+
+    from app.api.routers.auth import _client_key
+
+    request = Request(
+        {
+            "type": "http",
+            "headers": [(b"x-forwarded-for", b"203.0.113.99, 198.51.100.7")],
+            "client": ("172.20.0.3", 12345),
+        }
+    )
+    assert _client_key(request) == "198.51.100.7"
+
+
 def test_audit_export_accepts_naive_datetimes(ops_client):
     response = ops_client.get(
         "/api/v1/audit/export.csv",
@@ -194,3 +252,85 @@ def test_scan_does_not_flag_anonymised_customers_as_missing_fields(ops_client):
             db.execute(delete(AuditEvent).where(AuditEvent.entity_id == customer_id))
             db.execute(delete(Customer).where(Customer.id == customer_id))
             db.commit()
+
+
+def test_concurrent_quality_scans_leave_only_one_open_issue_per_condition():
+    barrier = Barrier(2)
+
+    def scan() -> None:
+        with SessionLocal() as db:
+            barrier.wait()
+            run_scan(db)
+
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor:
+        list(executor.map(lambda _index: scan(), range(2)))
+
+    with SessionLocal() as db:
+        duplicates = db.execute(
+            select(
+                DataQualityIssue.rule_type,
+                DataQualityIssue.entity_type,
+                DataQualityIssue.entity_id,
+                func.count(DataQualityIssue.id),
+            )
+            .where(DataQualityIssue.status == "open")
+            .group_by(
+                DataQualityIssue.rule_type,
+                DataQualityIssue.entity_type,
+                DataQualityIssue.entity_id,
+            )
+            .having(func.count(DataQualityIssue.id) > 1)
+        ).all()
+    assert duplicates == []
+
+
+def test_concurrent_issue_resolution_records_exactly_one_decision():
+    issue_id = uuid.uuid4()
+    issue_ref = f"DQ-RACE-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8].upper()}"
+    with SessionLocal() as db:
+        db.add(
+            DataQualityIssue(
+                id=issue_id,
+                public_ref=issue_ref,
+                rule_type="missing_required_field",
+                entity_type="customer",
+                entity_id=uuid.uuid4(),
+                severity="low",
+                status="open",
+                evidence_json={},
+                proposed_action_json={},
+                detected_at=datetime.now(UTC),
+            )
+        )
+        db.commit()
+
+    actor = CurrentUser(
+        public_ref="USR-RACE", display_name="Race Manager", role="operations_manager"
+    )
+    barrier = Barrier(2)
+
+    def resolve() -> str:
+        with SessionLocal() as db:
+            barrier.wait()
+            try:
+                return defer_issue(db, issue_ref, actor).status
+            except AppError as exc:
+                return exc.code
+
+    try:
+        with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor:
+            outcomes = list(executor.map(lambda _index: resolve(), range(2)))
+        assert sorted(outcomes) == ["ISSUE_NOT_OPEN", "deferred"]
+        with SessionLocal() as db:
+            decisions = db.scalar(
+                select(func.count(AuditEvent.id)).where(
+                    AuditEvent.entity_id == issue_id,
+                    AuditEvent.action == "data_quality_issue_deferred",
+                )
+            )
+        assert decisions == 1
+    finally:
+        with SessionLocal() as db:
+            db.execute(delete(AuditEvent).where(AuditEvent.entity_id == issue_id))
+            db.execute(delete(DataQualityIssue).where(DataQualityIssue.id == issue_id))
+            db.commit()

backend/tests/test_knowledge.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import httpx
 
 from app.api.routers import knowledge as knowledge_router
 from app.core.config import get_settings
+from app.core.ratelimit import SlidingWindowLimiter
 from app.services.knowledge import KnowledgeHealth
 from app.services.knowledge.demo import DemoKnowledgeProvider
 from app.services.knowledge.procedures import iter_procedure_documents
@@ -140,6 +141,16 @@ def test_ask_question_requires_authentication(client):
     assert response.status_code == 401
 
 
+def test_knowledge_questions_are_bounded_per_session_and_client(ops_client, monkeypatch):
+    limiter = SlidingWindowLimiter(max_requests=1, window_seconds=60)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(knowledge_router, "_question_limiter", limiter)
+    body = {"question": "What is the vehicle return procedure?"}
+    assert ops_client.post("/api/v1/knowledge/questions", json=body).status_code == 200
+    blocked = ops_client.post("/api/v1/knowledge/questions", json=body)
+    assert blocked.status_code == 429
+    assert int(blocked.headers["retry-after"]) >= 1
+
+
 def test_ask_question_is_audited_without_leaking_full_text(ops_client):
     ops_client.post(
         "/api/v1/knowledge/questions",
@@ -695,5 +706,38 @@ def test_ragcore_search_fallback_prefers_damage_procedure(monkeypatch):
         ),
     )
     answer = provider.ask("Wat moet ik doen bij schade?", "test-correlation-damage", "nl-BE")
+    assert answer.evidence_state == "insufficient"
+    assert answer.answer == ""
+    assert any(source.document_id == "damage-procedure" for source in answer.sources)
+
+
+def test_ragcore_search_fallback_accepts_relevant_damage_evidence_above_threshold(monkeypatch):
+    provider = RAGcoreKnowledgeProvider()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(provider._settings, "ragcore_space_id", "space-1")
+    search = _search_body()
+    search["results"].append(
+        {
+            "citation": {
+                "document_id": "damage-procedure",
+                "document_version_id": "version-2",
+                "title": "damage-procedure.md",
+                "section": "Damage",
+                "excerpt": "Record damage and keep the vehicle blocked.",
+            },
+            "rank": 1,
+            "scores": {"fused": 0.5},
+        }
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        provider,
+        "_client",
+        lambda: _FakeClient(
+            post_responses={
+                "/v1/answers": _FakeResponse(503, {}),
+                "/v1/search": _FakeResponse(200, search),
+            }
+        ),
+    )
+    answer = provider.ask("Wat moet ik doen bij schade?", "strong-damage", "nl-BE")
     assert answer.evidence_state == "grounded"
     assert answer.sources[0].document_id == "damage-procedure"

backend/tests/test_mcp_integrations.py

@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ def test_mcp_tool_requests_are_audited(client, ops_client):
     events = ops_client.get("/api/v1/audit", params={"action": "mcp_tool_request"}).json()
     assert len(events) >= 1
     assert events[0]["actor_type"] == "service"
+    assert events[0]["actor_label"] == "itworx-mcp-hub"
+    assert events[0]["metadata"]["reported_client_id"].endswith(":probe-1")
 
 
 def test_search_knowledge_respects_requested_locale(client):
@@ -135,7 +137,11 @@ def test_operations_summary_mints_correlation_id_when_none_supplied(client, ops_
     )
     assert response.status_code == 200
     events = ops_client.get("/api/v1/audit", params={"action": "mcp_tool_request"}).json()
-    matching = [e for e in events if e["actor_label"].endswith(":no-correlation-probe")]
+    matching = [
+        e
+        for e in events
+        if e["metadata"].get("reported_client_id", "").endswith(":no-correlation-probe")
+    ]
     assert len(matching) >= 1
     assert matching[0]["correlation_id"]  # a fresh UUID was minted, not left empty