Publish EventLens v1.1.0 (#1)
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@@ -13,17 +13,41 @@ Every incident carries a stable `rule_id`, bounded total time window, explicit p
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## Rules and boundaries
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- `windows.audit.log-cleared` — EventLog 1102 (Security audit log cleared) from the Security channel or EventLog 104 (an event log was cleared) from the System channel, in a bounded 300-second window per known host. Severity `critical`: records from before the clear may be missing. The reason states only what the record says about who cleared it.
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- `windows.crash.application-report` — Application Error 1000 and/or Windows Error Reporting 1001 from the exact Application provider/channel within 120 seconds, grouped by known host/process. The word “sequence” is reserved for evidence containing both records.
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- `windows.service.failure` — abnormal Service Control Manager 7023/7024/7031/7034 events from the System channel within 120 seconds, grouped by known host/service.
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- `windows.service.installed` — Service Control Manager 7045 from the System channel in a bounded 300-second window per known host/service name. Installation alone is not evidence of malice.
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- `windows.network.dns-timeout` — DNS Client 1014 events from the System channel in a bounded 120-second window per known host.
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- `windows.auth.failed-logon` — Security Auditing 4625 events from the Security channel in a bounded 120-second window per known host/account. One event is recorded evidence; two are repeated failures; three or more are called a burst.
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- `windows.auth.password-spray` — Security Auditing 4625 in a bounded 300-second window per known host and source address (`IpAddress`), kept only when the window contains at least three distinct target accounts. The reason says the pattern is consistent with, not proof of, password spraying. These events also remain evidence for `windows.auth.failed-logon`.
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- `windows.auth.account-lockout` — Security Auditing 4740 in a bounded 300-second window per known host/account.
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- `windows.account.change` — Security Auditing 4720 (user created) and 4728/4732/4756 (member added to a security group) in a bounded 300-second window per known host.
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- `windows.system.startup` — Kernel-General 12 or EventLog 6005 startup signals in a bounded 300-second window per known host.
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- `windows.system.shutdown.normal` — Kernel-General 13 or EventLog 6006 normal-shutdown evidence in a bounded 300-second window per known host.
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- `windows.system.shutdown.unexpected` — Kernel-Power 41 or EventLog 6008 unexpected-shutdown/restart evidence in a bounded 300-second window per known host. The reason describes evidence, not a cause.
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- `windows.generic.attention` — preserves unmatched warning/error evidence rather than hiding it.
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- `windows.generic.attention` — preserves unmatched warning/error evidence rather than hiding it. Unmatched events with the same known host, provider and event ID are burst-compressed into one bounded 300-second window; the incident keeps the highest level (`critical`, `error` or `warning`) of its evidence. Events with an unknown host, provider or event ID, or without a reliable timestamp, stay single-event incidents.
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A rule requires its provider and channel context; a coincidental Event ID from another provider is not classified as that rule. Missing/placeholder host, process, service or account values create an event-isolated group and the reason says that grouping was unavailable; they never become a shared `unknown-*` key. Events without a reliable timestamp remain evidence but do not enter temporal groups.
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A group is split when adding the next event would make the total span from the first event exceed the rule window. Equality at the boundary is included; one millisecond beyond it is split. This prevents a long chain of near-adjacent records from creating an unbounded incident.
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Repeated identical provider/event/summary signatures remain in the evidence timeline but are compressed in the incident summary; source records and evidence IDs are never removed. Events may support more than one specifically matching rule when their predicates independently match; no rule is treated as proof of root cause.
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## Campaigns
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Bounded windows keep incidents honest but fragment sustained activity: a brute force that runs for hours becomes thousands of 120-second incidents. A **campaign** is a summary layer on top of incidents, never a wider incident:
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- it links consecutive incidents of the same rule and the same known grouping key when the gap between one incident's last event and the next incident's first event is at most the rule window;
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- it needs at least two incidents; isolated (unknown-key) and untimed incidents never join one;
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- it carries a deterministic `campaign-…` ID derived from the rule and the ordered incident IDs, the time span, the incident IDs, the total evidence count, the highest severity and a reason that makes no causal claim;
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- each member incident references it through `campaign_id`. Incident windows, evidence IDs and incident IDs are unchanged.
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The Analysis workspace shows campaigns first and pages the remaining incidents by severity, so a large log stays readable.
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## Audit outcome
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Security events are logged at level 0 (“LogAlways”); success or failure lives in the `Keywords` bitmask. EventLens normalizes the audit-failure (`0x0010000000000000`) and audit-success (`0x0020000000000000`) bits into `outcome: "failure" | "success"`. The informational-noise filter treats audit failures as attention events, so failed sign-ins are not hidden by default.
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## Source integrity
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For uploaded files the API returns `source_info` with the SHA-256 and byte size of the exact uploaded bytes, computed in memory before parsing. Reports and exports include it so an analysis can be tied to the original file. The bundled demo has no `source_info`.
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